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INTRODUCTION 
[1] Sexting is a relatively recent practice engaged in by the young, and 
sometimes not-so-young, and foolish.1 “Sexting” is “the practice of 
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, 
including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over 
the Internet.”2 While sexting can and does occur between and among 
people of any age, the real concerns are with teenagers who are sexting.3 
 
                                                                                                                         
* Catherine Arcabascio is an associate dean and professor of law at Nova Southeastern 
University’s Shepard Broad Law Center. She also is the co-founder and former director 
of the Florida Innocence Project. The author wishes to thank her research assistant, Louis 
Leo IV, for his invaluable research assistance. 
1 Apparently, sexting knows no age limits. The American Association of Retired Persons 
(“AARP”) reports that seniors are sexting too. Jessica Leshnoff, C*U*2nite: Sexting Not 
Just for Kids, AARP, Nov. 2009, http://www.aarp.org/family/love/articles/ sexting_not_ 
just_for_kids.html. 
2 Miller v. Mitchell, No. 09-2144, 2010 WL 935766, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 17, 2010). For 
this article, the author refers to sexting as it primarily relates to the use of cellular phones 
to transmit digital images. 
3 The author has chosen to discuss this subject in terms of how it affects high school aged 
teenagers. She has used the word teenager or teen rather than juvenile, minor, or child 
because the sexting cases that have been reported are almost always between and among 
high school aged teenagers. As one of the cases discussed in this article shows, there are 
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[2] According to a 2008 study by The National Campaign to Prevent 
Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, 20% of teens between the ages of thirteen 
and nineteen have sent or posted nude or semi-nude digital photos of 
themselves.4 Of the 22% of teen girls that reported doing so, 11% of these 
girls were between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.5 When asked whether 
they have seen nude or semi-nude photos that were not intended to be 
shared with them, 25% of teen girls and 33% of teen boys answered this 
question affirmatively.6 
[3] Recently, law enforcement officers in several states have arrested 
teenagers who have sent sexually explicit photographs of themselves, as 
well as the recipients of those photographs.7 These teenagers have been 
either charged or threatened with charges of child pornography,8 and 
 
                                                                                                                         
sometimes serious differences in the treatment of those teenagers who may still be, for 
example, in their senior year of high school, but already have reached the age of eighteen. 
See infra Part II.C. Thus, for purposes of this article, the term teenager refers to those 
aged thirteen to eighteen. In other words, it reflects the general age group of those that 
attend high school. 
4 THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND 
TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2008), 
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf [hereinafter 
SEX AND TECH SURVEY]. 
5 Id. Of those reporting that they have sent or posted nude or semi-nude photographs, 
“71% of teen girls and 67% of teen guys . . . say they have sent/posted this content to a 
boyfriend/girlfriend.” Id. at 2.  
6 Id. at 3. 
7 See Mike Galanos, Commentary: Is ‘Sexting’ Child Pornography?, CNN, Apr. 8, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/08/galanos.sexting/ (referring to cases in Ohio, 
Florida, and Pennsylvania); Judith Levine, What’s the Matter with Teen Sexting?, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article= 
whats_the_matter_with_teen_sexting (citing arrests in Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, 
New Jersey, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah); Margaret 
Miceli, ‘Sexting’ Not Cause for Legal Intervention, THE DAILY COLLEGIAN ONLINE, Mar. 
30, 2009, http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2009/03/30/sexting_not_cause_ 
for_legal_in.aspx (referring to cases in New Jersey and Pennsylvania). 
8 See supra note 8; see also Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *1–2 ; State v. Canal, 773 
N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 2009). 
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appellate courts have upheld convictions against teenagers on these 
charges.9 Consequently, some of those teens have been required to register 
as sex offenders, a status that will stay with them for decades.10 This result 
leads to serious questions about the intent of child pornography statutes, 
the breadth of prosecutorial discretion, and the potential erroneous use of 
the criminal justice system to address what some believe would be better 
handled through educational programs and better parenting. 
[4] It goes without saying that this behavior should not be condoned. It 
is safe to assume that parents do not want their teenage children to send 
nude or semi-nude photos of themselves or others. It follows that parents 
would not want their teen to forward any inappropriate photos they 
received to another person. That being said, traditional notions of fairness, 
both societal and legal, require a more suitable response to the issue than 
convicting or threatening to convict those same teenagers of child 
pornography and labeling some of them as sex offenders. 
[5] As with most legal and societal issues, finding a workable solution 
to the problem is not always easy. A “one size fits all” solution to sexting 
may not work. For example, are there any circumstances in which the law 
should never consider a teenager’s sexting to be criminal? Are there other 
cases that warrant some sort of criminal charge that does not carry the 
everlasting label of pornographer and/or sex offender? And finally, are 
there other teenagers who ought to be treated as child pornographers 
because their behavior is consistent with an adult pornographer’s? When 
considered in combination with who is best-equipped to handle these 
issues and it becomes readily apparent why so many are scrambling to find 
a workable solution to sexting. 
 
                                                                                                                         
9 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
10 See Bianca Prieto, ‘Sexting’ Teenagers Face Child-Porn Charges, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 2009, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/orl-asec-sexting-
030809,0,938390,full.story; see also Florida Sexual Offenders and Predators, 
http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010); Florida Supervised Population 
Information Search, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ActiveOffenders/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2010). 
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[6] Part I of this article discusses the potential roots of this behavior 
between and among teenagers. It discusses youth, the technology that 
makes this behavior possible, and the natural tendencies of teenagers. Part 
II illustrates different types of cases that have resulted in either 
prosecutions or threats of prosecution under state pornography statutes. 
Part III discusses various issues surrounding the controversial prosecution 
of teenagers for sexting, including the treatment of teenagers as 
pornographers, the breadth of prosecutorial discretion in charging 
determinations, and the role of parents, schools, and the media. Part IV 
reviews and critiques recent legislative responses to sexting and provides 
suggestions for future legislation. It maintains that while there is no 
perfect “one size fits all” solution to sexting, punishing teenagers who sext 
as child pornographers is not the solution. Rather, some of these teens do 
not deserve to be punished criminally for their behavior. Finally, if 
legislators are intent on creating a criminal offense, they should only 
criminalize the unlawful dissemination of the digital photos to others. 
Arguably, there are teenagers who may be actual pornographers that 
should be charged with child pornography, but these criminals are not the 
focus of this article and will not be discussed in any detail. 
I.  THE PERFECT STORM: YOUTH, TECHNOLOGY, AND  
SEXUAL EXPLORATION 
[7] Any parent of a teenager will tell you that, no matter how smart 
their teenager is, odds are that he or she will have lapses in judgment 
during those hormone-driven, development years. In short, the fact that 
they are young is a problem in and of itself. That teenagers survive and 
actually make it to adulthood intact really is an amazing feat. In Roper v. 
Simmons,11 the United States Supreme Court noted the “impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions” of adolescents,12 who are 
“overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless 
behavior.”13  According to Harvard Medical School Neurology Professor, 
 
                                                                                                                         
11 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
12 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
13 Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992)). 
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Frances E. Jensen: “The teenage brain is not just an adult brain with fewer 
miles on it, . . . [i]t’s a paradoxical time of development. These are people 
with very sharp brains, but they’re not quite sure what to do with them.”14 
Research also indicates that the rapid growth and development of young 
brains “leaves teens easily influenced by their environment and more 
prone to impulsive behavior, even without the impact of souped-up 
hormones and any genetic or family predispositions.”15 
[8] And then there is technology. Computers and cellular phones have 
forever changed the way people interact. E-mail, blogging, texting, and 
tweeting impact our lives in ways we probably have not yet come to 
comprehend. Even septuagenarians are climbing on board the texting 
train, realizing that it is the only way to get a quick response from their 
grandchildren. 
[9] It is unlikely that today’s teenagers recognize or recall a world 
without cellular phones and texting. As an integral part of their lives, teens 
do not give these modes of communication or the way they are used a 
second thought. Some teens may even be more comfortable 
communicating in these ways. With the press of a button, whatever it is 
that they are thinking or viewing can be sent at lightning speed and with 
little reflection.  
[10] Moreover, technology and new modes of communication must be 
enticing to teens. Because of an explorative and inquisitive nature, teens 
always seem to be on technology’s cutting edge. While the rest of society 
believes that blogging is still hip, teens are busy “tweeting.”16  Teens do 
not need to be reminded that their phones actually have cameras, they can 
take and send digital photos of anything and everything in under a minute.  
 
                                                                                                                         
14 Debra Bradley Ruder, The Teen Brain: A Work in Progress, HARVARD MAGAZINE, 
Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 8, available at http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2008/09-pdfs/0908-8.pdf. 
15 Id.  
16 See generally Martha Irvine, Is Blogging a Slog? Some Young People Think So, 
BOSTON.COM, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/ 
2010/02/03/is_blogging_a_slog_some_young_people_think_so/ (noting decrease in blog 
usage among teens). 
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Indeed, Life magazine editors in the 1970s certainly understood youth’s 
fascination with technology. A cover of Life magazine in 1972 showed a 
“cluster of children grasping after a photograph whizzing out of the new 
[Polaroid] SX-70.”17 In a way, the instant photograph is an ancestor of 
sorts to a digital image sent by camera phone. Instant photography allowed 
pictures to be taken whenever and wherever, and to be shared 
immediately, without ever having to send it out to a third party for 
developing. 
[11] When Edwin Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation, first 
unveiled his instant camera, he probably never thought about how it could 
liberate society’s less inhibited members.18 Undoubtedly people used 
instant cameras to document all sorts of activities: some innocent, some 
not so innocent. For example, a racy instant photograph given to a friend 
could then be shared with others by passing it along by hand. But fast 
forward to the twenty-first century and say goodbye to the single instant 
photograph being shared by physically passing it around. Add modern 
communication technology, and the result is  “sharing” on steroids. 
[12] Today, approximately sixteen million children have cell phones.19 
83% of all cell phones sold in the United States in 2008 have built-in 
cameras.20 Even young children take photos with their cellular phones and 
 
                                                                                                                         
17 Polaroid Corporation, Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Polaroid-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). 
18 See id. 
19 Laura Petrecca, Cell Phone Marketers Calling All Preteens, USA TODAY,  
Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/gear/2005-09-05-preteen-cell-
phones_x.htm. 
20 Ki Mae Heussner, Should Silent Camera Phones Be Illegal?, ABC NEWS, Jan. 28, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=6750825&page=1 (last visited Feb. 
15, 2010). A recent survey on digital abuse conducted by MTV and the Associated Press 
found that of 1247 respondents aged under twenty-five, 81% have telephones with 
cameras. KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS-MTV POLL DIGITAL ABUSE 
SURVEY CONDUCTED BY KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS 2 (2009), http://surveys.ap.org/data/ 
KnowledgeNetworks/AP_Digital_Abuse_Topline_092209.pdf. 
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send them to others.21 It is no wonder that when you combine the natural 
state of a teenager with technology, something like “sexting” is born. 
What teens do not seem to grasp, however, is that sending an inappropriate 
photo of themselves or of anyone else, not only invites criticism, ridicule, 
and abuse by their peers, but may also result in child pornography 
convictions that subject them to harsh penalties.22  
[13] Attorneys Marsha L. Levick and Riya S. Shah, in an amicus brief 
submitted on behalf of the Juvenile Law Center to the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals in the sexting case Miller v. Mitchell,23 note that “[s]exting is 
the result of a unique combination of the well-recognized adolescent need 
for sexual exploration and the new technology that allows teens to explore 
their sexual relationships via private photographs shared in real-time.”24 
Adolescents develop their identities and discover themselves by “thinking 
and experimenting with areas of sexuality.”25 
 
                                                                                                                         
21 Some camera phones are particularly “kid-friendly.” Herb Weisbaum, Stay Connected: 
Best Cell Phones for Children, MSNBC, Dec. 16, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/16044093/. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 No. 09-2144, 2010 WL 935766 (3d. Cir. Mar. 17, 2010) 
24 Brief of Juvenile Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 6, Miller v. 
Miller, No. 09-2144 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.jlc.org/files/ 
briefs/JLC-Amicus-Miller-v-Skumanick.pdf [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center]. 
It should be noted that, pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, District Attorney Jeff Mitchell was substituted as appellant after defeating 
former District Attorney George Skumanick in a November 2009 election (while the case 
was on appeal). See Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *3. 
25 Id. (quoting Lynn E. Ponton & Samuel Judice, Typical Adolescent Sexual 
Development, 13 CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC N. AM. 497, 508 (2004)). 
Also, 66% of teen girls and 60% of teen boys claimed that they sent sexually suggestive 
content to be “fun and flirtatious.” SEX AND TECH SURVEY, supra note 4, at 4. The survey 
specifically defines the term “sexually suggestive pictures/video” and the term “sexually 
suggestive messages.” Id. at 5. The question referred to above discusses “sexually 
suggestive content,” which is not defined, but appears to encompass both of those 
categories. Id. at 4. Conversely, 52% of teen girls said they sent it as a “sexy present” for 
their boyfriend. Id. 
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[14] Although sexual activity rates actually decreased from 1991 to 
2007, there are quite a few sexually active teenagers.26 In fact, the Center 
for Disease Control reported that 47.8% of high school students had 
engaged in sexual intercourse.27 Given these statistics, it is not surprising 
that individuals in this age group would share nude or semi-nude 
photographs of themselves with their girlfriend or boyfriend, the most 
common recipient of such photographs.28 A study by MTV and the 
Associated Press found that 45% of those who reported having sex within 
the past week also reported at least one “sexting related activity.”29 
[15] The media also  has an effect on teens’ attitudes and beliefs about 
sex, as well as  their behavior.30 According to Professor Victor C. 
Strasburger: “There are dozens of studies that show that the media 
function essentially as a super peer group, making teenagers believe that 
everyone out there is having sex but them . . . .”31 Internet dissemination 
of nude photos of Disney’s High School Musical star Vanessa Hudgens 
after she apparently sent them via cell phone to her co-star, Zac Efron, is 
just one example.32 
 
                                                                                                                         
26 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TRENDS IN THE PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL 
BEHAVIORS 1 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/yrbs07_us_sexual_ 
behaviors_trend.pdf. 
27 Id. 
28 See SEX AND TECH SURVEY, supra note 4, at 2. 
29 ASSOCIATED PRESS & MUSIC TELEVISION, A THIN LINE 2 (2009), 
http://www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Executive_Summary.pdf. 
30 Victor C. Strasburger, Anything Goes! Teenage Sex and the Media, J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY CAN., Feb. 2008, at 109, 109, available at http://www.sogc.org/jogc/ 
abstracts/full/200802_Editorial_1.pdf. 
31 Id. at 109–10. 
32 See Bianca Prieto, Teens Learning There Are Consequences to “Sexting,” SEATTLE 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/ 
2008845324_sexting12.html. See generally Amy Harrington, Celebrity Sex Tape 
Scandals, FOXNEWS.COM, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/ 
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II.  THREE SEXTING CASES 
[16] There are many different ways to charge a teen with “sexting” 
under existing child pornography laws.33 First, a teen sending a nude or 
semi-nude photo to another person can be charged with possession or 
dissemination of child pornography.34 Second, the recipient of such a 
photo can be charged with possession of child pornography simply 
because the digital image is on his or her phone.35 Third, the initial 
recipient can be charged with child pornography if he or she forwards the 
digital image to anyone else.36 Depending on the state in which they live 
and the crime with which they are charged, some minors run the risk of 
being placed on their state’s sex offender registry.37 
 
                                                                                                                         
2009/08/28/celebrity-sex-tape-scandals/ (listing fifteen celebrities involved in sex tape 
scandals). 
33 The definition child of pornography varies from state to state. Melissa Wells et al., 
Defining Child Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in Investigations of Internet 
Child Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 270 (2007). As the focus of 
this article is not to challenge the language of every statute, but rather to challenge the 
use of child pornography statutes for prosecuting teenage sexters, the author only 
generally refers to child pornography. The sections of this article that discuss actual cases 
or legislative efforts to curb sexting refer to the specific statutory definitions in the 
particular state under discussion. 
34 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(c)(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
35 See, e.g., id. § 6312(d)(1). 
36 See, e.g., id. § 6312(c)(1). 
37 The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Act”) requires that minors be 
subjected to sex offender registry requirements. See Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra 
note 25, at 27–28. The Act requires that all states substantially comply with the 
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) or risk 
losing funding from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Id. at 28. As of 
February 1, 2009, no state had been certified to be in substantial compliance with the Act. 
See S. 125, 2009-2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/Acts/ACT058.pdf. See generally Brief of Juvenile 
Law Center, supra note 25, at 27–30 (providing a detailed discussion of SORNA). 
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[17] In contrast, imagine a factual scenario involving an underage 
defendant that warrants a child pornography charge. For example, a 
sixteen or seventeen-year-old who abuses or exploits a child by taking 
sexually explicit photographs and distributing them for profit as a child 
pornographer. In this scenario, there is no significant difference between 
an adult and a minor pornographer. The purpose of enacting child 
pornography laws was to protect children from that type of exploitive 
predator, regardless of the predator’s age. Thus, these teenagers should be 
prosecuted as child pornographers.38 
A.  Case One: “Victims” and “Child Pornographers”? 
[18] Now imagine two different scenarios regarding the transmittal of 
the following photos via cell phone: (1) a photo of two teens wearing 
opaque bras and (2) a photo of one teen wearing a towel around her torso, 
with her breasts exposed. Should either of those scenarios constitute child 
pornography, and should prosecutors charge the teens in those digital 
photographs accordingly? In the opinion of a Pennsylvania prosecutor, the 
answer was a resounding “yes.”39 
[19] In early 2009, George Skumanick, Jr., the District Attorney of 
Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, threatened to charge a number of 
teenagers with child pornography.40 School officials in the Tunkhannock, 
Pennsylvania, School District had confiscated several student cell phones 
 
                                                                                                                         
38 The author does not propose a lesser punishment for minors whose behavior causes the 
type of harm child pornography laws seek to prevent. Therefore, this article does not 
discuss the merits of charging such minors with child pornography crimes. 
39 See Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *1–2.  In his brief to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, appealing the grant of a temporary restraining order against his office, 
Skumanick reversed his decision to seek prosecution of the two teens photographed while 
wearing opaque bras. See Brief of Appellant at 4, Miller v. Skumanick, No. 09-2144 (3d 
Cir. June 29, 2009) (“After a full review of the factual circumstances of the case, District 
Attorney Skumanick has determined he will bring no criminal charges against [the two 
teens who were photographed wearing opaque bras].”)  The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that the issues as they related to the two teens were moot. See Miller, 
2010 WL 935766, at *5. 
40 Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *1–2.   
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and found digital photos of nude and semi-nude teenage girls, some of 
whom attended schools in the same school district.41 One photograph 
showed two teen girls, “from the waist up, wearing white, opaque bras.”42 
One girl was on the phone, and the other was making the peace sign.43 A 
different photograph showed a teenager with a towel wrapped around her 
torso just below her exposed breasts.44 She appeared to have just come out 
of the shower.45 Skumanick stated that the photographs of the teenagers in 
such provocative poses were in violation of Pennsylvania’s child 
pornography statute.46 When asked by the parents to provide a definition 
of the word “provocative,” Skumanick refused to do so.47 He did, 
however, state to newspaper reporters that students who possess 
“inappropriate” digital photos of minors expose themselves to possible 
prosecution for possessing or distributing child pornography, which is a 
felony.48 
[20] The threat of prosecution was directed at both the girls in the 
photos as well as the teens whose phones contained the digital photos.49 
Skumanick informed all the potential defendants and their parents that he 
would drop the charges if the teens successfully completed a six to nine 
 
                                                                                                                         
41 Id. at *1. 
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at *3. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at *2. The Pennsylvania statute to which Skumanick referred was 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West Supp. 2010). 
47
 Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *2. Interestingly, § 6312(g) of the Pennsylvania statute 
defines a “[p]rohibited sexual act” as including “lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity 
if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any 
person who might view such depiction.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(g) (West Supp. 
2010). The statute does not ban all nude photos. See id. § 6312(b). 
48 Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *1. 
49 Id. 
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month program of education and counseling.50 The District Attorney’s 
Office sent a letter to the teens and their parents that also warned that 
failure to participate or failure to complete the program successfully would 
result in felony charges being filed against the teens. 51 At a subsequent 
face-to-face meeting, the prosecutor again reiterated the threat and stated 
that the teens would be on probation and would have to pay a $100 fee for 
the program. 52  
[21] The parents of three of the girls filed a Civil Rights Act section 
1983 complaint first, claiming retaliation in violation of their First 
Amendment right to free expression.53 In a second cause of action, the 
girls claimed retaliation in violation of their First Amendment right to be 
free from compelled expression for requiring them to write a paper 
indicating that what they had done was wrong.54 A third cause of action 
claimed retaliation against the parents for exercising the Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process right to direct their children’s 
upbringing.55 
[22] “Skumanick pointed out that these charges were felonies that could 
result in long prison terms and would give even juveniles a permanent 
record,” contending that a finding of guilty would likely subject the three 
teenage girls “to registration as sex offenders under Pennsylvania’s 
Registration of Sexual Offenders Act (‘Meghan’s Law’), 42 P.S. § 9791, 
for at least ten years and have their names and pictures displayed on the 
 
                                                                                                                         
50 Id. at *1–2. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *2. 
53 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (M.D. Pa. 2009). The two girls wearing 
opaque bras and the girl wearing a towel around her torso with her breasts exposed and 
their parents filed the section 1983 complaint. Id. at 639. 
54 Id. at 640. 
55 Id. 
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state’s sex-offender website.”56 But in March 2009, the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted a temporary 
restraining order against the District Attorney of Wyoming County, 
Pennsylvania during the pendency of the section 1983 claim.57 Less than a 
year later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard arguments in this case, 
which appears to be the first sexting-related case in a federal appellate 
court.58 On March 17, 2010, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive 
relief.59  
 
                                                                                                                         
56 Id. at 637–638. Even though the court stated that the defendant contended that the 
plaintiffs could be placed on the sex offender registry, it appears that the court might have 
erroneously attributed that statement to the defendant and instead it actually was referring 
to a statement made by the plaintiffs in paragraph seventeen of the plaintiff’s section 
1983 complaint. See id. at 638. The current laws in Pennsylvania do not require minors to 
register as sex offenders. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1 (West 2007).   
57 Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
58 See generally ACLU of Pennsylvania, Miller, et al. v. Skumanick, 
http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/milleretalvskumanick.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2010). 
59 Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *12. The Third Circuit held that any future prosecution in 
this case would be a retaliatory act. Id. at *7. First, it agreed with the District Court that 
the plaintiffs showed a “reasonable likelihood of establishing that coercing Doe’s 
participation in the education program violated (a) Jane Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right to parental autonomy and (b) Jane Doe’s First Amendment right against free 
speech.” Id. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the District Attorney could not 
“coerce parents into permitting him to impose on their children his ideas of morality and 
gender roles” by threatening prosecution. Id. at *8. According to the court, while 
educators have a secondary responsibility in the upbringing of children, the “District 
Attorney is not imbued with that same ‘secondary responsibility.’” Id.. The court also 
held that Nancy Doe could establish that having to write an essay describing why her 
actions were wrong(in order to successfully complete the education program) would 
violate her First Amendment freedom against compelled speech. Id. at *9.Second, it held 
that  responding to the appellants’ exercise of their constitutional rights by threatening 
prosecution was  a retaliatory act. Id. at *10. Third, the court also determined that there 
was a causal link between the constitutionally protected activity and the retaliation. Id. 
Specifically, the District Attorney’s motive in prosecuting the appellant was likely 
retaliatory because, not only was there direct explicative evidence of his threats to 
prosecute, but there was also insufficient evidence of probable cause. Id. The record did 
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B.  Case Two: Underage Couple Take Nude  
Digital Photos of Themselves 
[23] In A.H. v. State,60 a Florida appellate court upheld the adjudication 
of delinquency of a sixteen-year-old girl, A.H., under Florida’s child 
pornography statute, for sexting her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, 
J.G.W.61 Although A.H. and J.G.W. took photos of themselves engaged in 
sexual conduct, they never sent them to a third party. Both A.H. and 
J.G.W. faced charges of producing, directing, or promoting a photograph 
that contained sexual conduct in violation of Florida Statutes section 
827.071(3).62 J.G.W. also was charged with of one count of possession of 
child pornography under section 827.01(5).63 
 
                                                                                                                         
not establish that the appellant ever possessed or distributed the photograph in question. 
Id.   
60 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
61 See id. at 239. 
62 The relevant portion of the statute reads: 
 (1) As used in this section, the following definitions shall 
apply: 
 . . . . 
 (b) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, 
photograph, or dance or any other visual representation exhibited 
before an audience. 
 (c) “Promote” means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, 
provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, 
circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise or to offer or agree 
to do the same. 
 . . . . 
 (g) “Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, 
or sadomasochistic abuse; actual lewd exhibition of the genitals; actual 
physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic 
area, buttocks, or, if such person is a female, breast, with the intent to 
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[24] A.H. filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that section 827.071(3) 
was unconstitutional in its application to her case, that her privacy 
interests were implicated, that she was younger than her alleged victim, 
her boyfriend, and that prosecution was not the least intrusive means of 
furthering a compelling state interest.64 The lower court denied the motion 
on the basis of a compelling state interest in protecting children from 
sexual exploitation and found A.H. delinquent.65  
 
                                                                                                                         
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party; or any act or conduct 
which constitutes sexual battery or simulates that sexual battery is 
being or will be committed. A mother’s breastfeeding of her baby does 
not under any circumstance constitute “sexual conduct.” 
 (h) “Sexual performance” means any performance or part 
thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child of less than 18 years 
of age. 
 . . . . 
 (3) A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a 
child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he or she 
produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes sexual 
conduct by a child less than 18 years of age. Whoever violates this 
subsection is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as 
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (2009). 
63 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235 n.1. This statute provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess a photograph, 
motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, or other presentation 
which, in whole or in part, he or she knows to include any sexual 
conduct by a child. The possession of each such photograph, motion 
picture, exhibition, show, representation, or presentation is a separate 
offense. Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 
775.084. 
§ 827.071(5). 
64 A.H., 949 So .2d at 235. 
65 Id. at 235. 
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[25] The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.66 The appellate court noted that the state’s compelling interest 
applies whether the defendant is a child or an adult.67 It reasoned that 
prosecuting A.H. under the child pornography statute is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling state interest because it 
“enables the State to prevent future illegal, exploitative acts by supervising 
and providing any necessary counseling to the child.”68  
[26] Although the court reasoned that, in Florida, “the law relating to a 
minor’s right of privacy to have sex with another minor is anything but 
clear,” even assuming that the right existed under the Florida Constitution, 
this right did not extend to “memorializing” the act in photographs.69 The 
court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in this case, 
because “the decision to take photographs and to keep a record that may 
be shown to people in the future weighs against a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”70 In addition, the court determined that the photos were e-
mailed to “another computer” from A.H.’s house.71 The court stated that 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because A.H. and J.G.W. 
had shared the photos with each other without any assurance that a third 
party would not be shown the photos.72 “[U]nlike adults who may be 
involved in a mature committed relationship,” a sixteen-year-old and a 
seventeen-year-old could have no “expectation that their relationship will 
continue and that the photographs will not be shared either intentionally or 
 
                                                                                                                         
66 Id. at 239. 
67 See id. at 238. 
68 Id. at 236. 
69 Id. at 237–39. 
70 Id. at 237 (citing Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 
2005)). 
71 Id. at 235.  The dissent clarified this somewhat technologically imprecise statement by 
the majority, explaining that A.H. apparently e-mailed the photos to her boyfriend’s 
personal e-mail address.  See id. at 240 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
72 A.H., 949 So .2d at 237. 
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unintentionally.”73 The court concluded that without “the sanctity of law 
[or] the stability of maturity or length,” distribution of the photographs 
was likely.74 In support of its conclusion, the court surmised that motives 
for dissemination could be profit based on the market value of the 
photographs or based on a teenager’s interest in bragging about their 
sexual exploits.75  
[27] Even assuming that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed, 
the court held that the statute served a compelling state interest furthered 
in the least restrictive manner.76 Finding the interest in preventing 
exploitation to be the same “whether the person inducing the child to 
appear in a sexual performance and then promoting that performance is an 
adult or a minor,”77 the court reasoned that “the statute was intended to 
protect minors like appellant and her co-defendant from their own lack of 
judgment.”78  This rationale is troubling at best. The court’s opinion relied 
heavily on the notion that the two children involved were immature and 
required protection from themselves, and yet, it upheld a conviction 
against them on felony pornography charges.79 In essence, the court found 
that the government has a simultaneous compelling state interest in both 
protecting and convicting children in child pornography cases despite the 
fact that those same children, by the court’s own definition, lack the 
 
                                                                                                                         
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at 238. 
77 Id. (including the interestingly worded rationale that “[t]he state’s purpose in this 
statute is to protect minors from exploitation by anyone who induces them to appear in a 
sexual performance and shows that performance to other people”). 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 241 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
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“foresight and maturity” to “make an intelligent decision about engaging 
in sexual conduct and memorializing it.”80 
[28] In dissent, Judge Padovano stated that applying the statute in this 
case did violate A.H.’s right to privacy.81 Judge Padovano relied on B.B. v. 
State,82 which held that a statute prohibiting unlawful carnal intercourse 
was unconstitutional as applied to a minor,83 in stating that he was “not 
able to reconcile” what he called “a distinction without a difference.”84 
According to Judge Padovano: “If a minor cannot be criminally 
prosecuted for having sex with another minor, as the court held in B.B., it 
follows that a minor cannot be criminally prosecuted for taking a picture 
of herself having sex with another minor.” As noted by Judge Padovano, 
the only difference in A.H.’s case was that the minors photographed their 
sexual act.85   
[29] Judge Padovano correctly pointed out that speculative risk of 
potential disclosure should not be the gauge by which we determine 
whether the child had a reasonable expectation of privacy.86 Although a 
risk of disclosure always exists, Judge Padovano drew a distinction 
between those cases in which the images are shared with third parties and 
those in which they are not. He also noted that the intention of the statute 
is to protect children from abuse by others.87 Judge Padovano 
hypothesized that if a child had a printed photograph rather than a digital 
one, whether the photo is put in a purse that is subsequently stolen or put 
 
                                                                                                                         
80 Id. at 238 (majority opinion). 
81 Id. at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
82 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995). 
83 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at 239. 
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in the mail box, a third person could have seen it.88 According to Judge 
Padovano, there is always a risk that a third party may see a photo, 
regardless of whether it is a digital image or not, or whether it is on 
someone’s computer or in someone’s purse.89  
C.  Case Three: Angry Boyfriend Sends Photos of His Girlfriend to Others 
[30] In another Florida case, Phillip Alpert, then a high school senior, 
had an argument with his high school sweetheart.90 Alpert had just turned 
eighteen and his girlfriend was sixteen, and they had been dating for two 
and one-half years.91 After the argument, Alpert sent a nude photo of his 
girlfriend, which she had taken herself and sent to him, to more than 
seventy of her friends and family members.92 According to Alpert, he 
“was upset and tired and it was the middle of the night” when he sent the 
photo.93 Nevertheless, Alpert was charged and convicted of sending child 
pornography 94 In addition to five years probation, Alpert was required to 
register as a sex offender in the State of Florida.95 
 
                                                                                                                         
88 Id. at 240. 
89 Id. 
90 Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender List, CNN, 
Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts. During Phillip 
Alpert’s interview on MTV’s “Sexting in America” program, he stated that this occurred 
one month after he turned eighteen and that his then girlfriend was seventeen. See A Thin 
Line, Sexting in America (Part 1), http://www.athinline.org/videos/17-sexting-in-
america-part-1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
91 Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. 
92 Id.; see also Prieto, supra note 34. 
93 Id.; see also Prieto, supra note 34. 
94 Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. Alpert was charged under Florida Statute  
§ 847.0137(2), but the Florida legislature currently is considering a bill that  
creates a new and separate offense of sexting: Florida Statute  § 847.0146. See  
House of Representatives Staff Analysis of CS/HB 1335 at 4, available at 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1335b.P
SDS.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1335&Session=2010 (last visited 
March 31, 2010). The bill, pending before the Criminal and Civil Justice Appropriations 
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[31] As a registered sex offender, Alpert’s photo is currently on display 
on the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Sexual Offender 
website.96 In addition to his probationary status, his Department of 
Corrections number, date of birth, and his physical description, the 
website provides his address, along with a map indicating exactly where 
he lives.97 The website also provides an abbreviated title of the crime, 
“Send Child Porn,” and the specific statute violated, F.S. 847.0137(2).98 
 
                                                                                                                         
Committee, punishes the act of sexting when a minor “knowingly uses computer or other 
device to transmit or distribute photograph or video of himself or herself which depicts 
nudity and is harmful to minors, or knowingly possesses such photograph or video to 
minor from another minor.” H.R. 1335, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2010). The 
distribution, transmission or possession of multiple photographs would be considered a 
single offense if the distribution or transmission occurred within the same 24 hour period. 
Id. 
 The first violation of the statute would be a “non-criminal violation,” which 
would be punishable by 8 hours of community service and a $25 fine. See House of 
Representatives Staff Analysis of CS/HB 1335 at 4, available at 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1335b.P
SDS.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1335&Session=2010 (last visited 
March 31, 2010). The minor also could be ordered to attend “suitable training or 
instruction” instead of community service. Id. A second violation would be considered a 
2d degree misdemeanor punishable by up to 60 days in jail and a $500 fine. Id. A third 
violation would be considered a 1st degree misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in 
jail and a $1,000 fine. Id. Finally, a fourth or further violation would be a 3rd degree 
felony punishable by up to five years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Id. 
 Interestingly, the House of Representatives Staff Analysis Report for the bill 
references Phillip Alpert’s case twice. See Id. However, a similar outcome would result 
under the proposed statute because an 18-year-old high school student is not considered a 
minor. See FLA. STAT. § 847.001(8) (2008) (defining a minor as any person under the age 
of 18). 
95 Id. 
96 Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Phillip Michael Alpert – Florida Sexual 
Offender, http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/flyer.do?personId=60516 (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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As a condition of his probation, a photo and similar information about 
Alpert is on the Florida Department of Corrections website as well.99 
[32] Unless Alpert receives a pardon or his is conviction set aside, he 
will remain on the sex offender registry for decades.100 Even after he is 
released from probation, the statute requires that Alpert remain on the 
registry for a minimum of twenty-five years.101 After the twenty-five year 
period has elapsed, however, he may be able to petition the court to 
remove his information from the sex offender registry.102 Thus, Alpert will 
be on the sex offender registry until he is approximately forty-three years 
old. 
III.  THE ISSUES SURROUNDING SEXTING 
A.  Are Sexters Pornographers? 
[33] While possessing or sending child pornography clearly is and 
should be a punishable offense,103 the act of voluntarily sending or 
receiving nude or semi-nude photos, without threat or coercion, should not 
be considered a punishable offense. As a voluntary act, sexting should not 
fall within the punishable acts contemplated by modern child pornography 
statutes. Nor should a teenager’s voluntary forwarding of nude or semi-
nude photos, sent without threat or coercion, be punished as a child 
pornography offense. But using these statutes to punish this group of 
misguided teens goes beyond the contemplated purpose and intent of those 
laws and can ultimately cause a lifetime of harm.104 In essence, 
 
                                                                                                                         
99 Florida Department of Corrections, Supervised Population Information Detail, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ActiveOffenders/detail.asp?Bookmark=1&From=list&SessionI
D=755638431 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
100 See FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(11) (2009). 
101 See id. § 943.0435 (11)(a)(1). 
102 See id. If Alpert is arrested for any felony or misdemeanor offense, he will be 
ineligible to petition for his information to be removed. Id. 
103 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). 
104 See United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918–919 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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prosecutors are obtaining, and courts are upholding, convictions against 
those whom these statutes are supposed to protect.105  
[34] The purpose of child pornography statutes is to shield children 
from the abuse that occurs in the production of the photo.106 In Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court found that prohibitions in the 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 were overbroad and 
unconstitutional.107 The decision in Free Speech Coalition found 
unconstitutional the expansion of the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(“CPPA”) to include “virtual” child pornography.108 The Court held that 
the CPPA violated the First Amendment’s freedom of speech provision.109  
[35] While the underlying facts of Free Speech Coalition are markedly 
different than those presented in sexting cases, the Court in Free Speech 
Coalition reiterated several relevant principles underlying the rationale for 
punishing child pornography,110 enunciated previously in New York v. 
Ferber
111 and Osborne v. Ohio.112 These basic principles should apply 
equally to any attempt to use pornography statutes to charge teenagers 
who voluntarily send, receive, or disseminate nude or semi-nude photos 
while sexting. 
[36] The Court in Ferber was concerned with the exploitation of 
children, stating that “the use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional and mental health of 
 
                                                                                                                         
105 See id. at 919. 
106 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002). 
107 Id. at 258. 
108 Id. at 256. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 249–50. 
111 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
112 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
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the child.”113 “The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”114 In 
upholding New York’s child pornography statute, the Court in Ferber 
linked the distribution of photographs that contained sexual activity by 
juveniles to the sexual abuse of children.115 According to the Court, the 
pornographic materials would be “a permanent record” of the child’s 
participation in the exploitative act and the harm would be “exacerbated 
by their circulation.”116 The critical issue always has been “whether a child 
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the 
work.”117 In addition, the Court determined the only way to effectively 
control “the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation 
of children” was to tackle the distribution network of child 
pornography.118  
[37] The Court in Free Speech Coalition stated that “Ferber’s judgment 
about child pornography was based upon how it was made, not on what it 
communicated.”119 In Free Speech Coalition, the Court once again linked 
the abuse of children to the validity of laws prohibiting child pornography 
by stating: “Where the images are themselves the product of child sexual 
abuse . . . the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to any 
judgment about its content.”120 That statement should not be broadly 
construed to suggest that the state’s interest in “stamping out” child 
pornography should be able to stand alone. As noted by the Court, a 
charge of child pornography requires a proximate link to a crime, i.e. the 
 
                                                                                                                         
113 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
114 Id. at 757. 
115 Id. at 759. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 761. 
118 Id. 
119 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250–51. 
120 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002). 
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child abuse in the production of the pornographic image.121 Thus, where 
no crime occurs in the taking of the picture, the distribution argument 
cannot stand alone and must fail.122 Moreover, the threat of a future harm 
from some speculative potential circulation of the photo, either through 
phones or the Internet, cannot not serve as a proper rationale for finding 
such a statute, or its use, constitutional.123 
[38] Although other courts have employed this principle in child 
pornography cases, the outcome is not always identical to that of Free 
Speech Coalition.124 Despite the conclusion of the Florida District Court 
of Appeals that the victim in A.H. was guilty of child pornography, it 
nonetheless utilized language consistent with the language used in Ferber 
and Free Speech Coalition.125 The Florida court stated that Florida’s 
interest lies “in protecting children from exploitation.”126 The language in 
A.H. also indicates that the government is intent on avoiding exploitation 
that arises from the inducing of a child to pose in a provocative way.127 
[39] But not all situations involving nude photography fall within the 
purview of child pornography statutes identified in Ferber, Osborne v. 
Ohio, and Free Speech Coalition. For instance, consider the hypothetical, 
yet common, situation where a teenage girl voluntarily sends a nude 
picture of herself to her boyfriend. Under these circumstances, the 
exchange of nude photography should not be considered exploitation or 
child abuse. As such, the girl should not be treated as a disseminator of 
 
                                                                                                                         
121 Id. at 236. 
122 See id. at 235. 
123 See id. at 253. 
124 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. 747; A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007). 
125 See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237. 
126 Id. at 238. 
127 See id. at 238. However, the court reasoned that potential future circulation constituted 
a compelling government interest. Id. 
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child pornography and her boyfriend should not be prosecuted as a 
possessor of child pornography. 
B.  The Breadth of Prosecutorial Discretion 
[40] Unfortunately, the Skumanick and A.H. cases are excellent 
examples of the concerns regarding the breadth of prosecutorial discretion 
in sexting cases. It is apparent from these cases that prosecutors across the 
country are dealing with sexting cases in an inconsistent way.128 Some 
prosecutors, like Mr. Skumanick in Pennsylvania, are threatening to 
charge the females in the transmitted photos and create for them an 
unconstitutional Hobson’s choice.129 Other prosecutors are charging the 
senders, disseminators, and the recipients.130 Still others are choosing not 
to prosecute these teens at all.131 Without clear guidance from state 
legislatures, prosecutors will continue to struggle with these charging 
decisions. 
[41] Prosecutors in the United States have broad discretion in criminal 
prosecutions.132 “So long as there is probable cause to believe that the 
accused has committed an offense, the decision to prosecute is within the 
prosecutor’s discretion.”133 There are, of course, exceptions to this 
statement.134 A prosecutor who acts in bad faith or violates the constitution 
by initiating or pursuing charges has strayed beyond the latitude that he is 
 
                                                                                                                         
128 See generally Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009); A.H., 949 
So. 2d 234; Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. 
129 See, e.g., Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *10.  
130 See, e.g., Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. 
131 See, e.g., Teens Avoid Detention in Sexting Case, SEATTLE P.I., Feb. 17, 2010, 
http://www.newsrunner.com/display-article/?eUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.seattlepi.com 
%2Flocal%2F415555_sexting28.html%3Fsource%3Drss&eSrc=Seattle+Post-
Intelligencer+-+Seattle+WA&eTitle=Teens+avoid+detention+in+sexting+case. 
132 Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 219, 219 (2009). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 223. 
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given.135 Nonetheless, it is rare for the judiciary to intervene in the 
decision-making process of the prosecutor.136 
[42] Two of the most important determinations made by a prosecutor 
are whether to charge a person with a crime and which charges to bring 
against the person.137 The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice 
Standards articulate the function of the prosecutor.138 Standard 3-1.2(c) 
states that “[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”139 Thus, the question with respect to the prosecution of sexting 
cases should be framed in terms of justice.  
[43] The true meaning of justice in this context, however, remains 
opaque. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “justice” as “[t]he fair and proper 
administration of laws.”140 According to Webster’s Dictionary, the 
definition of just, as in a just result, is “having a basis in or conforming to 
fact or reason.”141 Webster’s also defines it as “acting or being in 
conformity with what is morally upright or good.”142 
 
                                                                                                                         
135 Id. at 223–24. 
136 Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 
(2002). But see Miller, 2010 WL 935766, at *12. 
137 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS § 3-1.2 
(1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_blk.html. 
138 Id. These standards “are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and 
performance. They are not intended to be used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of 
alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to determine the validity of a conviction. They may 
or may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation, depending on all the circumstances.” 
Id. § 3-1.1. 
139 Id. § 3-1.2. 
140 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (9th ed. 2009). 
141 MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 636 (10th ed. 1999). 
142 Id. 
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[44] Prosecutorial discretion goes beyond merely establishing probable 
cause.143 Probable cause is a threshold requirement for all criminal 
prosecutions.144 If probable cause were the sole factor taken into 
consideration in determining whether to charge, then there would be no 
need for prosecutorial discretion at all. Having discretion requires the 
prosecutor to go further and to ask whether filing charges would further 
justice. In most cases, the answer to that singular question is likely to 
come easily. In reality, it is not one question asked, but rather a series of 
questions, that ultimately leads to the conclusion that furthering justice 
requires bringing charges against a particular individual: 
 1)  Is there a valid purpose to the prosecution and 
does this prosecution support the legislative intent of the 
statute? 
 2)  Is there an individual or class of individuals that 
the law seeks to protect and does this prosecution further 
that interest? 
 3)  Is there an individual or class of individuals that 
the law seeks to punish and does this prosecution further 
that interest? 
 4)  Does the prosecution of this person do more 
good than harm to society?145 
Before making the determination to proceed with such a serious offense as 
child pornography, prosecutors who consider charging teenagers should 
carefully consider each of these questions. In cases of sexting, perhaps the 
answer to at least a few of those questions will be “no.” 
 
                                                                                                                         
143 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
144 Id. 
145 See generally Krug, supra note 138. 
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C.  The Role of Parents, Schools, and the Media 
[45] While sexting prosecutions are popping up across the country, 
there is nothing to suggest that there is a sexting “epidemic.” This is not to 
say that sexting does not have the potential to become a bigger problem in 
the future without some sort of action now. Regardless of how states 
choose to tackle sexting, their efforts will likely be less fruitful without 
assistance from parents, schools, and the media. 
[46] As with all problems involving children, parents must be on the 
frontlines controlling inappropriate behaviors. Controlling and monitoring 
the use of a teenager’s cell phone or computer is clearly within the power 
of a parent. A parent has the ability to take away a teenager’s phone or 
simply to remove texting abilities on that phone. 
[47] Parents, schools, and the media can also play a critical role in 
educating teens about sexting and other bullying offenses. In fact, there 
are school districts across the country required by law to have either 
bullying or cyberbullying policies.146 These policies ought to include an 
educational component that covers sexting. 
[48] The media also can play a part in the education of teenagers. For 
example, MTV aired a program called “Sexting in America: When 
Privates Go Public” as part of a larger outreach effort called “A Thin 
Line.”147 To its credit, MTV created “A Thin Line” as part “of a multi-
year initiative . . . aimed at stopping the spread of abuse in the form of 
sexting, cyberbullying and digital dating abuse. The goal of the initiative 
is to empower America’s youth to identify, respond to and stop the spread 
of the various forms of digital harassment.”148 Reaching teenagers with a 
 
                                                                                                                         
146 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Cyberbullying: State Legislation, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12903 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
147 See A Thin Line, http://www.athinline.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
148 MTV Launches ‘A Thin Line’ To Stop Digital Abuse, MTV, Dec. 3, 2009, 
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1627487/20091203/story.jhtml. For this initiative, 
MTV partnered with Facebook, MySpace, the Family Violence Prevention Fund, 
WiredSafety, the Anti-Defamation League, Blue Shield of California Foundation, 
LoveIsRespect.org, the National Teen Dating Abuse Helpline, the National Network to 
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message from a source that they can relate to seems like a step in the right 
direction. But the success of this type of outreach remains to be seen. 
D.  The Punishment Does Not Fit the Act 
[49] A teen that voluntarily takes or sends a nude or semi-nude photo of 
him or herself and any other teen who receives that same photo should not 
be charged with child pornography possession or distribution. And a child 
pornography charge is also inappropriate for the teen that subsequently 
forwards that photo.  
[50] According to Professor Joshua Dressler, “lawmakers must 
ascertain not only what conduct is wrongful, but they must determine 
which persons may properly be held accountable for their wrongful 
conduct. And, when punishment is deemed appropriate, legislators must 
decide what and how much punishment fits the offense and the 
offender.”149 
[51] Consider Phillip Alpert’s case. It should not have been prosecuted 
as a child pornography case. Although Alpert’s dissemination of an 
otherwise private photograph of his ex-girlfriend was wrong,150 the more 
appropriate question is what crime, if any, did Alpert commit and how 
should the court punish him.  
[52] By his own admission, Alpert was upset at his ex-girlfriend and in 
that angry thoughtless moment did a despicable thing; he sent nude photos 
of his girlfriend to her friends and family.151 He intentionally transmitted 
those digital photos to hurt and humiliate her.152 This behavior may have 
 
                                                                                                                         
End Domestic Violence, Liz Claiborne Inc., DoSomething.org, Break the Cycle, Ruder 
Finn, Teenangels, and PBS’s “Frontline.” See MTV’s A Thin Line: About the Campaign, 
http://www.athinline.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
149 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 11 (5th ed. 2009). 
150 See Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. 
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been many things, including criminal in nature, but it was not the act of a 
child pornographer. Assuming that states want to regulate and punish 
some of these behaviors, then behavior such as Alpert’s should be 
punished for what it is: a twenty-first century version of bullying or 
harassment rather than the sex offense of “sending child pornography.”153 
[53] The National Crime Prevention Council describes cyberbullying as 
the “use [of] the Internet, cell phones, or other devices to send or post text 
or images intended to hurt or embarrass another person.”154 In general, 
most of the cyberbullying statutes require repeated abuse.155 
Cyberbullying is becoming more and more common and can be a serious 
offense with serious consequences, both for the victim and the 
defendant.156 Approximately nineteen states have addressed cyberbullying 
through a variety of laws that either criminalize behavior and/or require 
schools to take action.157 Sexting and other types of online bullying are 
being categorized by the media under the umbrella term “digital abuse.”158 
[54] Cyberbullying in the form of sexting can have a devastating impact 
on some teenagers.159 One Ohio high school senior, Jesse Logan, sent a 
 
                                                                                                                         
153 See generally NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 21ST CENTURY BULLYING: 
CRUELER THAN EVER 1 (2010), http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/ 
21st%20Century%20Bullying%20-%20Crueler%20Than%20Ever.pdf (last visited Mar. 
15, 2010). 
154 National Crime Prevention Council, Cyberbullying FAQ for Teens, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/cyberbullying-faq-for-teens (last visited on 
Mar. 15, 2010). 
155 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 165 (noting, for example, 
that Idaho’s statute requires the act to be “sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive”). 
156 See Laura Crimaldi, Teens May Face Criminal Charges in Cyberbullying Case, 
BOSTONHERALD.COM, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/ 
view.bg?articleid=1232335. 
157 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 165. 
158 See, e.g., MTV Launches ‘A Thin Line’ To Stop Digital Abuse, supra note 167. 
159 See, e.g., Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide over ‘Sexting,’ TODAY, Mar. 6, 
2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030. 
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nude photo of herself to her boyfriend.160 After they broke-up, he sent the 
digital photo to hundreds of others.161 As a result, Logan became the 
victim of continued bullying and abuse.162 Girls at school began calling 
her a slut and a whore.163 The boyfriend’s act of sending the photos set off 
a chain reaction of harassment so great that Logan did not want to go to 
school anymore.164 Tragically, several months later, she hung herself.165 
[55] Even though this exemplifies the potentially devastating result of 
cyberbullying, neither Logan’s ex-boyfriend nor Philip Alpert is a 
pornographer. They are, however, bullies of the worst kind. Both violated 
the trust and privacy of someone with whom they had an intimate 
relationship to humiliate and degrade that person.166 Accordingly, they 
deserve to be punished for their actions. But these actions are not related 
to child pornography. 
IV.  THREE NEW SEXTING LAWS: CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
[56] States are struggling to determine the proper response to the issues 
that have arisen in prosecuting children for child pornography.167 As of 
this writing, twelve states have  introduced legislation related to sexting.168 
 
                                                                                                                         
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.; see also Teenage Girl Hanged Herself After Bullying over ‘Sexting,’ TELEGRAPH, 
Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/5010361/ 
Teenage-girl-hanged-herself-after-bullying-over-sexting.html. 
166 See Celizic, supra note 161; Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 91. 
167 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Sexting Legislation 2009, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
168 Id. These include Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont. Id. Of these, only six have 
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Vermont, Nebraska, and North Dakota, have approached the issue in three 
very different ways.169 
A.  Vermont 
[57] Legislators in Vermont chose to criminalize the act of sexting for 
minors.170 Vermont’s new sexting law went into effect in July of 2009.171 
The most important aspect of the law is that it removes the criminal 
behavior from the grasp of pornography-type statutes and thereby avoids 
the requirement of registration on the state’s sex offender list.172 
[58] Section 2802b(a)(1) of the Vermont Criminal Code states that 
“[n]o minor shall knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or 
coercion use a computer or electronic communication device to transmit 
an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person.”173 In 
 
                                                                                                                         
been passed and are currently in effect: Colorado, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Utah, and Vermont. Two others, Pennsylvania and Kentucky, “are expected to consider 
legislation.” Id. 
169 See id. 
170 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009). 
171 Legislature Examines ‘Sexting’; Underage Callers Swap Nude Photos, ALLBUSINESS, 
Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-
legislative/12769717-1.html. 
172 See id. 
173 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(1). There is no definition of “indecent visual 
depiction” in the statute nor in section 2801, which contains definitions for Vermont’s 
obscenity laws. See id.; id. § 2801. However, indecent material, as used in sections 2802 
and 2802a, includes a picture “of a person or portion of the human body which depicts 
nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.” Id. §§ 
2802, 2802a. The definition of nudity under section 2801 of the Vermont Statutes is: 
[T]he showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or 
buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the 
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion 
thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male 
genitals in a discernibly turgid state. 
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addition, section 2802b(a)(2) states that “[n]o person shall possess a visual 
depiction transmitted to the person in violation of subdivision (1) of this 
subsection. It shall not be a violation of this subdivision if the person took 
reasonable steps, whether successful or not, to destroy or eliminate the 
visual depiction.”174 
[59] Subsection (a)(1) seeks to punish a minor who sends an indecent 
photo of himself or herself, and subsection (a)(2) punishes any person, 
adult or minor, who receives and remains in possession of an indecent 
visual depiction.175 The punishment of minors under either of these 
subsections is the same.176  The charges under subsection (a) are brought 
in family court as a “juvenile proceeding,” where the court has discretion 
to refer a first time offender to a “juvenile diversion program.”177 
[60] Additionally, if no court has previously adjudicated the minor 
under subsection (a) of the statute, the present court cannot adjudicate him 
under Vermont’s sexual exploitation of children statute or require him to 
register as a sex offender.178 If a court has previously adjudicated a minor 
under subsection (a), the court may  adjudicate the minor in family court 
or he may be prosecuted in Vermont’s district court for sexual exploitation 
of children.179 Most importantly, however, he still will not be required to 
 
                                                                                                                         
Id. § 2801(2). Because the titles of sections 2802, 2802a, and 2802b all refer to “indecent 
material,” it appears that the intent of the drafters was to have all of the statutes cover the 
same type of materials. 
174 Id. § 2802b(a)(2). 
175 See id. §§ 2802b(a)(1)–(2). 
176 Id. § 2802b(b). 
177 Id. § 2802b(b)(1). 
178 Id. § 2802b(b)(2). 
179 Id. § 2802b(b)(3). 
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register as a sex offender.180 Moreover, if a minor is adjudicated, his 
records will be expunged once he reaches eighteen years of age.181 
[61] Interestingly, a person eighteen years of age or older who is in 
possession of indecent photos of a minor in violation of this statute may be 
fined up to $300 or be imprisoned for more than six months or both.182 
Thus, it appears from the language of this statute that an adult will be 
charged only with a misdemeanor if he is in possession of an “indecent 
visual depiction” of a minor, so long as the minor sent the photograph or 
image knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion.  
[62] Vermont’s statute is a step in the right direction because it does not 
allow prosecutors to charge minors with pornography offenses for first 
offenses and does not require registry on the sex offender site.183 This 
statute, however, seems to provide a safeguard for the receiver of the 
photograph as long as the receiver takes reasonable steps to destroy or 
eliminate the visual depiction.184 For example, if a boyfriend strongly 
encourages, but does not “threaten or coerce” his girlfriend into sending an 
indecent photograph, so long as he deletes it after viewing it, it will not be 
considered a violation of the statute.185 In contrast, it will always be a 
violation for the sender.186 
[63] Although a step in the right direction, it does not go far enough in 
protecting all high school aged teenagers, especially those that turn 
eighteen before graduating. Even in states with enrollment cutoffs, such as 
 
                                                                                                                         
180 Id. 
181 Id. § 2802b(b)(4). 
182 Id. § 2802b(c). 
183 See id. §§ 2802b(b)(1)–(2). 
184 Id. § 2802b(a)(2). 
185 See id. §§ 2802b(a)(1)–(2). 
186 Id. § 2802b(a)(1). 
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Florida, which require that a child be born before September,187 or like 
California and Michigan that use December,188 many teens turn eighteen 
while they are still in high school. Unfortunately, no magic “adult” switch 
goes off in the middle of their senior year.  Because there is no age switch 
to trip, the social environment for students that turn eighteen in high 
school does not change. Thus, in the typical case arising from boyfriends 
and girlfriends sending sext messages, states like Vermont will continue to 
treat teenagers differently. Consider, for example, a teenager who is 
turning eighteen while still in high school and is dating someone in their 
own grade who is seventeen. Although the two may be less than a year 
apart, only the seventeen year old is considered a minor under these 
statutes.189 One possible remedy for this problem is to include age 
provisions similar to those used in some statutory rape statutes, sometimes 
referred to as “Romeo and Juliet” statutes.190 These statutes identify age 
gaps between the individuals in order to determine whether the action of 
the older individual is criminal.191 
 
                                                                                                                         
187 FL. STAT. §§ 1003.21(1)(a)–(b) (2009). 
188 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48000(a) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
380.1147(2) (West 2005). 
189 It is unclear from section 2802b whether someone eighteen or older who has been 
convicted of section 2802b is eligible for the sex offender registry. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 
13, § 2802b(c). On the one hand, the statute explicitly excludes minors from registration 
on the sex offender list but this language does not appear in subsection (c), which 
criminalizes the behavior of a person eighteen or older as a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 
2802b(b)(2), (c). On the other hand, section 5401 of the Vermont Statutes that governs 
the sex offender registry does not include section 2802b as a triggering offense. Id. § 
5401(10)(A)–(B). 
190 See, e.g., id. § 3252(c)(2) (creating an exception for consensual acts between parties 
less than nineteen and older than fifteen). 
191 Id. §§ 3252(c)(2), (f)(1)–(2), (g). 
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B.  Nebraska 
[64] Nebraska has taken a different approach.192 The Nebraska Criminal 
Statutes criminalize possession of “any visual depiction of sexually 
explicit conduct.”193 Section 28-1463.02(5) defines sexually explicit 
conduct as: 
(a) Real or simulated intercourse, whether genital-genital, 
oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal between persons of 
the same or opposite sex or between a human and an 
animal or with an artificial genital; (b) real or simulated 
masturbation; (c) real or simulated sadomasochistic abuse; 
(d) erotic fondling; (e) erotic nudity; or (f) real or simulated 
defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual 
gratification or sexual stimulation of one or more of the 
persons involved.194 
[65] There are two ways a defendant can avail himself of an affirmative 
defense to this charge.195 The first is straightforward. Pursuant to section 
 
                                                                                                                         
192 See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813.01 (Supp. 2009) (outlining the criminality of 
visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct). 
193 Id. § 28-813.01(1). Visual depiction is defined as: 
[L]ive performance or photographic representation and includes any 
undeveloped film or videotape or data stored on a computer disk or by 
other electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual 
image and also includes any photograph, film, video, picture, digital 
image, or computer-displayed image, video, or picture, whether made 
or produced by electronic, mechanical, computer, digital, or other 
means. 
Id. § 28-1463.02(6). 
194 Id. § 28-1463.02(5). 
195 See id. § 28-813.01(3) (outlining the requirements to meet the affirmative defense for 
visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct). 
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28-813.01(3), the defendant will have an affirmative defense if the visual 
depiction portrays no person other than the defendant.196 
[66] The second requires the defendant to satisfy seven elements before 
he can qualify for an affirmative defense: 
(i) The defendant was less than nineteen years of age; (ii) 
the visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct portrays a 
child who is fifteen years of age or older; (iii) the visual 
depiction was knowingly and voluntarily generated by the 
child depicted therein; (iv) the visual depiction was 
knowingly and voluntarily provided by the child depicted 
in the visual depiction; (v) the visual depiction contains 
only one child; (vi) the defendant has not provided or made 
available the visual depiction to another person except the 
child depicted who originally sent the visual depiction to 
the defendant; and (vii) the defendant did not coerce the 
child in the visual depiction to either create or send the 
visual depiction.197 
[67] Thus, under Nebraska law, someone under the age of nineteen who 
disseminates or makes the photo “available” to another would not be 
entitled to this affirmative defense under any circumstances.198 The 
statute, as written, is broad enough to encompass the act of showing 
someone else a sexually explicit picture on the accused’s phone.199 The 
defense also is unavailable for the minor who receives a sexually explicit 
photo, knowingly generated by someone fifteen years of age or older and 
voluntarily sent without coercion by the defendant, that contains more 
than one child.200 For example, if a seventeen-year-old girl voluntarily 
 
                                                                                                                         
196 Id. § 28-813.01(3)(a). 
197 Id. § 28-813.01(3)(b). 
198 Id. §§ 28-813.01(3)(b)(i), (vi). 
199 See id. 
200 Id. §§ 28-813.01(3)(b)(ii)–(v). 
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sends her eighteen-year-old boyfriend a photograph in which she and one 
of her girlfriends appear, and the photograph contains sexually explicit 
conduct as defined by the statute, the older boyfriend will not be entitled 
to this affirmative defense, despite the fact that the number of people and 
content in the picture are completely out of his control.201 
[68] That being said, Nebraska’s affirmative defense does take into 
account many of the legitimate concerns raised in this article.202 For 
example, it does take into consideration that eighteen-year-olds ought to 
have the same protection as other teenagers and does define the age group 
as “fifteen years of age or older” to under nineteen.203 It also distinguishes 
between possession and dissemination by offering the defense only to 
those who do not disseminate the photographs.204 
[69] In 2009, Nebraska also amended an existing statute that 
criminalizes the making, publishing, creating, generating, or providing of 
a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct or generating in any manner 
a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct.205 It is an affirmative 
defense to that section of the statute if the sexually explicit image only 
includes the defendant, who must have been younger than eighteen at the 
time of the depiction.206 If a person is charged with distributing the 
depiction, it is an affirmative defense if: 
(a) the defendant was less than eighteen years of age, (b) 
the visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct includes no 
person other than the defendant, (c) the defendant had a 
reasonable belief at the time the visual depiction was sent 
to another that it was being sent to a willing recipient, and 
 
                                                                                                                         
201 See id. §§ 28-813.01(3)(b)(i)–(vi). 
202 See generally id. § 28-813.01(3). 
203 Id. §§ 28-813.01(3)(b)(i)–(ii). 
204 Id. § 28-813.01(3)(b)(vi). 
205 Id. § 28-1463.03(1). 
206
 See id. §§ 28-1463.03(5)–(6). 
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(d) the recipient was at least fifteen years of age at the time 
the visual depiction was sent.207 
A person also has an affirmative defense if the sexually explicit image 
only includes the defendant, who was younger than eighteen at the time of 
the depiction.208  
C.  North Dakota 
[70] North Dakota has passed a law that specifically criminalizes the 
dissemination of a “sexually expressive image,” which is defined by 
statute as “a photograph or visual representation that exhibits a nude or 
partially denuded human figure.”209 North Dakota targets individuals who 
disseminate such “sexually expressive images” with a specific intent.210 
Under the North Dakota statute, “[a] person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor if, knowing of its character and content,” he or she 
“[d]istributes or publishes, electronically or otherwise, a sexually 
expressive image with the intent to cause emotional harm or humiliation to 
any individual depicted in the sexually expressive image.”211 
[71] This law is a bit more expansive in that it criminalizes the behavior 
of minors and adults alike.212 Thus, anyone who disseminates a sexually 
expressive image with the intent to cause emotional harm or humiliation to 
the person in the image commits a class A misdemeanor by doing so.213 
 
                                                                                                                         
207 Id. § 28-1463.03(6). 
208 See id. § 28-1463.03(5). 
209 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(13) (Supp. 2009). 
210 See id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(b). 
211 Id. 
212 See id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1). 
213 See id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(b). North Dakota’s statute also contains a provision, 
although oddly written and which may wind up being a loophole for deviant parents who 
are sex offenders, that appears to protect parents who may send partially nude, yet 
entirely innocent, photos of their young children. See id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(3). It states that 
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Unlike the other laws, it specifically targets the dissemination of 
photographs and includes a specific intent component.214 The person who 
disseminates the image also must have “the intent to cause emotional harm 
or humiliation.”215 
[72] While identifying specific intent makes this statute sounder in 
some ways, an obvious concern for prosecutors is the increased difficultly 
in proving the crime. On the one hand, these photos could be disseminated 
with the specific intent to humiliate and cause emotional harm, like Phillip 
Alpert.  On the other hand, if the disseminator of a nude photo could 
establish that his intent was to “share” the photo with friends, rather than 
to humiliate or cause harm, then a conviction certainly would be more 
difficult to obtain.216 
D.  Finding the Proper Response 
[73] The question of whether to file criminal charges against and punish 
teenagers who participate in consensual sexting remains problematic. 
Currently there is neither a universal response to sexting, nor a consistent 
approach in legislation dealing with sexting.217 
[74] Sexting between or among teens certainly is not behavior that the 
rational adult condones, but to treat sexters as pornographers flies in the 
face of reason. One thing is clear: high school teenagers who sext should 
 
                                                                                                                         
“[t]his section does not authorize any act prohibited by any other law. If the sexually 
expressive image is of a minor and possession does not violate section 12.1-27.2-04.1, a 
parent or guardian of the minor may give permission for a person to possess or distribute 
the sexually expressive image.” Id. 
214 See id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(b). 
215 Id. 
216 This is because the North Dakota statute requires as a material element of sexting the 
specific “intent to cause emotional harm or humiliation.” Id.; see also Don Corbett, Let’s 
Talk About Sext: The Challenge of Finding the Right Legal Response to the Teenage 
Practice of “Sexting,” 13 J. INTERNET LAW 3, 6 (2009) (stressing the intent and context 
behind sending sexually explicit images). 
217 See supra Parts IV.A–C . 
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not face charges under pornography statutes. The harm caused to 
teenagers greatly outweighs any benefit to society. It is incomprehensible 
to treat a teenager like a pedophile, rapist, or pornographer, and subject 
him or her to almost a lifetime classification as a sex offender for sexting. 
[75] Certainly, there is a valid argument that teenagers will be generally 
deterred from engaging in this behavior if prosecutors continue to file 
charges against them, and the media continues to report it.218 But general 
deterrence may not be effective at curbing the behavior of teenagers. 
“Minors tend to be less capable of making mature judgments about their 
behavior choices . . . .”219 Indeed, “[t]eens seem to be more fearful of 
being punished by their parents or of being the target of disapproval from 
their friends than they are of the police.”220 
[76] On the one hand, teenage sexters who voluntarily and without 
coercion sext each other, without disseminating the photos to a third party, 
should not be charged with a crime. Parents and educators are in a better 
position to deal with misguided behavior that should remain as private as 
possible.221 Thus, legislators should work to protect teens from 
pornography prosecutions that will cause them irreparable harm.  
[77] On the other hand, the teenage sexter who forwards nude 
photographs may deserve punishment. But, the punishment should not 
include naming him as a sex offender and causing him to endure decades 
of being on a sex offender registry.  
 
                                                                                                                         
218 According to Joshua Dressler, a person “will avoid criminal activity if the perceived 
potential pain (punishment) outweighs the expected potential pleasure” the person obtains 
from the act. DRESSLER, supra note 151, at 14–15. Underlying this theory is the goal of 
general deterrence. A person will be punished so that others in the community will think 
twice before committing a crime.” Id. 
219 LARRY J. SIEGAL & JOSEPH J. SENNA, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THEORY, PRACTICE, 
AND LAW 86 (7th ed. 2000). 
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221 See generally Post of Stacey Garfinkle to On Parenting, 
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[78] In punishing the sexter who forwards or further publicizes to third 
parties digital photos voluntarily sent to him, there are several factors that 
state legislators ought to take into consideration if they intend on 
addressing sexting as a crime.222 First, legislators can certainly use the 
North Dakota model and identify a specific intent as a part of the crime.223 
However, as mentioned above, attaching a specific intent may open the 
door to a failure to prove the crime.224 An alternative would be to craft a 
statute that criminalizes the dissemination of digital photos through the use 
of cellular phones or computers with the intent to cause harm or 
humiliation to a third party, and to include that dissemination to more than 
a certain number of people creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to 
cause harm or humiliation. 
[79] Finally, if legislators decide to address sexting by criminalizing the 
electronic transmission of digital images of minors, they should consider 
drafting laws that treat those under the age of nineteen the same as their 
high school peers.225 Those teens that do not disseminate the photographs 
to third parties should be provided educational alternatives in diversionary 
programs and should have the charges dismissed and all records expunged 
upon successful completion of the program, provided that it is a first 
offense.  
[80] For teenage sexters that disseminate nude or semi-nude photos, the 
charge should, at most, be a misdemeanor, and the court should offer first 
time offenders an educational program rather than any jail time. 
 
                                                                                                                         
222 See Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When 
Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 41–42 (2009). 
223 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(b) (Supp. 2009). 
224 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
225 States also may choose to criminalize the dissemination, by cellular phone or 
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would not matter. See § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
[81] The underlying problem in sexting is not actually in the technology 
that is used, but instead, in the misguided choice the teen made when he or 
she first sent or forwarded the nude photo. Parents should have the 
primary responsibility of educating their children and monitoring their 
behavior when it comes to sexting.  
[82] Although criminalizing the behavior may be appropriate in certain 
sexting cases involving the dissemination of nude photos, the task of 
educating teens about the consequences of sexting is best left to parents 
rather than prosecutors. Parents have a duty to protect their children and 
are in the best position to punish them accordingly. Thus, even though it 
will not prevent a teen from using someone else’s phone, parents can 
make sexting more difficult by removing or restricting texting capabilities 
on their children’s phones. They can also monitor computer use. Schools 
and the media can also play a role in the education of teenagers and 
thereby assist parents in their responsibilities. 
[83] Teenagers who engage in voluntary sexting are not child 
pornographers, even if they forward photos to others. Thus, prosecuting 
them under laws designed to protect children from exploitation is not 
reasonable. In cases where intervention by the state is justified, legislators 
should carefully craft legislation that will properly reflect society’s 
concerns about its teens but does not expose them to disproportionate 
punishment for their acts.  
